The Role of Judicial Review in the Realization of Constitutional Rights in Iran and Iraq

Abstract

Judicial review constitutes one of the principal mechanisms through which constitutional supremacy and the effective protection of constitutional rights are secured. This article comparatively examines the role of constitutional review in Iran and Iraq, focusing on the institutional structure of review, citizens’ access to constitutional protection, institutional independence, procedural effectiveness, and the enforceability of constitutional decisions. The study adopts a comparative descriptive-analytical approach and evaluates the Iranian Guardian Council and the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court as two distinct models of constitutional supervision. In Iran, constitutional review is predominantly preventive and is exercised by the Guardian Council before parliamentary enactments acquire final legal force. This model contributes to normative coherence and prevents unconstitutional legislation from entering the legal system, but it does not provide citizens with a general mechanism for direct constitutional complaint. In Iraq, constitutional review is predominantly judicial and subsequent, allowing constitutional questions to arise after laws and regulations have entered into force and providing broader procedural opportunities for interested parties. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the Iraqi model is affected by challenges relating to institutional stability, political pressure, jurisdictional boundaries, and the practical implementation of constitutional decisions. The comparative analysis demonstrates that neither a political-preventive model nor a judicial-subsequent model is sufficient by itself to guarantee constitutional rights. Effective constitutional protection requires the simultaneous presence of accessible procedures, institutional independence, transparent and consistent constitutional reasoning, clear jurisdictional rules, and reliable enforcement mechanisms. The study concludes that Iran would benefit from developing controlled mechanisms for post-enactment constitutional access and greater transparency in constitutional reasoning, while Iraq requires stronger institutional stability, clearer jurisdictional boundaries, and enhanced safeguards for judicial independence. The comparative experience of both countries shows that the realization of constitutional rights ultimately depends on the functional quality of constitutional review rather than the formal classification of the reviewing institution.