The Logic of Interest Alignment and Regional Coalition-Building in the Persistence of Iran–U.S. Hostility: A Structural Neorealist Analysis of Israel and Saudi Arabia

Abstract

The persistence of hostility between Iran and the United States constitutes one of the most enduring patterns of strategic confrontation in the Middle East. This article examines this hostility from a structural neorealist perspective, with particular emphasis on the regional interests of Israel and Saudi Arabia and the role of interest alignment and coalition-building in reinforcing the existing balance of power. The study adopts a descriptive-analytical approach and focuses on the interaction between threat perception, relative capabilities, regional balancing, external security partnerships, and strategic competition. The analysis indicates that Iran–U.S. hostility cannot be understood solely as a bilateral dispute, because its continuation produces significant security, political, and economic consequences for other regional actors. Israel perceives Iran’s nuclear activities, missile and drone capabilities, and regional networks as major threats to its security and therefore benefits from sustained American attention to constraining Iranian power. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, seeks to preserve a favorable regional balance through continued security cooperation with the United States while simultaneously attempting to reduce the costs of direct confrontation with Iran. Although Israeli and Saudi interests are not identical, their overlapping concerns regarding Iranian regional influence create incentives for parallel balancing and selective strategic convergence. The United States functions as the principal external power through which much of this balancing is organized, while Iran responds through deterrence, regional partnerships, diplomatic diversification, and strategic adaptation. The findings show that this reciprocal process produces a self-reinforcing security dilemma in which balancing by one side generates counterbalancing by the other, thereby contributing to the durability of Iran–U.S. hostility. The article concludes that a sustainable reduction in bilateral confrontation requires not only direct Iran–U.S. engagement but also broader regional mechanisms capable of reducing threat perceptions and limiting incentives for recurrent coalition-building and counterbalancing.