Admissibility of "Raw Neural Data" as Criminal Evidence in Criminal Courts: A Jurisprudential, Legal, and Neuroscientific Analysis

Abstract

The growing convergence of neuroscience and criminal law, known as neurolaw, has presented a new challenge regarding the admissibility of "raw neural data" (e.g., EEG signals and brain activity) as criminal evidence in judicial proceedings. This study aims to examine the position of these data within Iran’s criminal evidence system, employing a descriptive-analytical method with an interdisciplinary approach to assess the threefold dimensions of scientific, legal, and jurisprudential aspects of the issue. Research findings indicate that from a scientific perspective, raw neural data lacks the necessary validity to serve as independent and conclusive criminal evidence due to high uncertainty, technical challenges in collection and interpretation, and the existence of an "explanatory gap" between purely biological brain activity and criminal intent. From a legal perspective, mandatory reliance on such data contradicts the principles of fair trial, particularly the right to silence, presumption of innocence, and the right to mental privacy. Finally, from a jurisprudential standpoint, the lack of sufficient certainty regarding this evidence renders it subject to the principle of doubt (dara') and prevents the formation of the jurisprudential concept of "judicial knowledge" (ilm al-qadi) required for proving hudud or qisas. The research findings indicate that, in the current state, raw neural data can only be used as supplementary evidence alongside other traditional forms of evidence; its use should be restricted to the preliminary investigation phase and only with informed consent. Therefore, the enactment of stringent regulatory standards and the establishment of specialized neurolaw committees to assess the scientific validity of such evidence is an indispensable necessity.