The Role of Expediency and Public Order in Restricting Freedom of Expression under Iranian Law and International Human Rights Instruments

Abstract

Freedom of expression, as one of the most fundamental human rights, is recognized in most legal systems and international human rights instruments. This right constitutes the foundation for the realization of other civil and political rights and is regarded as a prerequisite for the informed participation of citizens in public life. Nevertheless, freedom of expression is not an absolute right and may be subject to restrictions in the interest of public order, national security, public morals, and the rights of others. Under Iranian law, concepts such as public interest and public order are regarded as central grounds for justifying limitations on freedom of expression and are clearly reflected in legal texts, particularly in the Constitution and criminal and media laws. By contrast, within the international human rights system, foundational instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) permit restrictions on this right only within the framework of necessity, proportionality, and the legitimacy of the aim pursued. The main question of this research is whether the standards governing the imposition of restrictions on freedom of expression under Iranian law are aligned with international human rights norms. To address this question, a descriptive–comparative analytical method has been employed. The findings indicate that although both systems emphasize the necessity of preserving public order and societal interests, the standards of clarity, necessity, and proportionality are not articulated in Iranian law with the same precision and explicitness as in international instruments. This situation provides grounds for broad and, at times, overly restrictive interpretations of freedom of expression in practice. The study concludes that by clarifying the concepts of public interest and public order on the basis of international interpretative principles and strengthening judicial oversight, a more balanced relationship between individual freedoms and collective interests can be achieved.