Misperceiving Iran through a Weberian Lens and the United States’ Interpretive Failure in Foreign Policy

Abstract

This article examines the enduring conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States as a case of structural misperception rooted in incompatible systems of meaning rather than merely competing interests. It argues that conventional materialist and strategic explanations are insufficient to account for the persistence and depth of this confrontation. Drawing on Weber’s interpretive sociology and contemporary international order theory, the study conceptualizes misperception as an epistemological condition produced by the interaction of two distinct rationalities: the Westphalian, instrumental rationality embedded in U.S. foreign policy institutions and the post-Westphalian, value-rational logic that structures Iran’s foreign policy identity. The article demonstrates how the 1979 Islamic Revolution constituted a civilizational rupture that redefined Iran’s conception of legitimacy, security, and diplomacy, transforming foreign policy into a form of moral-mission agency grounded in divine sovereignty, resistance, independence, transnational solidarity, and justice. In contrast, the United States continues to interpret global politics through secular, state-centric, and institutional assumptions that systematically distort its understanding of Iran’s motivations and intentions. Through an interpretive qualitative analysis of political discourse, doctrinal texts, and strategic narratives, the study shows how U.S. foreign policy cognition reproduces misperception over time, stabilizing conflict through self-reinforcing cycles of threat perception, coercive response, and ideological mistrust. The findings suggest that sustainable engagement between Tehran and Washington cannot be achieved through technical agreements or coercive instruments alone but requires a fundamental transformation in the cognitive and interpretive foundations of policy. By highlighting the role of identity, meaning, and rationality in shaping international conflict, the article contributes to a broader rethinking of foreign policy analysis in an era of post-Westphalian transformation.