The Status of Quasi-Legislative Institutions in the Legal Systems of Iran and Iraq: With Emphasis on Non-Parliamentary Authorities and Normative Pluralism

Abstract

This article examines the status of institutions that operate outside the legislative branch or at the margins of conventional legislative mechanisms and play a role in the formulation, interpretation, oversight, or enforcement of binding norms. In this study, such institutions are cautiously and descriptively referred to as “quasi-legislative” institutions. The central question is whether these authorities operate solely within the scope of delegated powers or whether they may, at times, become centers for the formation of parallel normative frameworks and, if so, how their relationship with the rule of law, separation of powers, public accountability, and citizens’ rights should be evaluated. The study adopts a descriptive-analytical and comparative method, focusing on constitutional rules, formal institutional structures, and examples of customary and administrative norm-making in Iran and Iraq. An examination of the text of the Iranian Constitution demonstrates that the legislative authority of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the supervisory role of the Guardian Council, the dispute-resolution mechanism of the Expediency Discernment Council, the authority to adopt executive regulations, and the possibility of reviewing certain administrative regulations coexist within a complex and multilayered institutional framework. In Iraq, the 2005 Constitution, on the one hand, defines the Parliament and the government within a federal structure and, on the other hand, recognizes independent commissions, the Federal Supreme Court, and regional and local institutions. Nevertheless, institutional ambiguities and disagreements concerning the limits of jurisdiction may expand the role of non-parliamentary authorities. The comparison demonstrates that the designation “quasi-legislative” does not, by itself, constitute a sufficiently precise legal characterization and that a distinction must be drawn among institutions with an explicit constitutional basis, authorities established under ordinary legislation, administrative mechanisms, and customary or social institutions. The article concludes that the principal issue is not the existence of such institutions per se, but rather the quality and clarity of the legal basis of their authority, the transparency of their procedures, the availability of independent oversight, access to judicial remedies, and respect for fundamental rights. The principal recommendation is to develop a comprehensive map of institutional competences, ensure the regular publication of enactments and decisions issued by relevant authorities, guarantee effective judicial review, and clearly determine the relationship between formal legal norms and customary rules.