A Comparative Study of Concentration in Iranian and French Civil Procedure and Its Role in Balancing Judicial Justice with the Speed and Order of Proceedings

Abstract

Build–Operate–Transfer (BOT) contracts, as one of the most significant models of public–private partnership (PPP), play a pivotal role in financing and developing public infrastructure, particularly in developing countries. However, the complexity of the structure of these contracts and their long-term nature have made “risk allocation” one of the most challenging legal and economic dimensions of Build–Operate–Transfer agreements. Imbalance in the distribution of risks between the government and the private investor may lead to increased project costs, reduced investment attractiveness, contractual disputes, and ultimately the failure of infrastructure projects. In the Iranian legal system, these challenges have been intensified by legislative ambiguities, fragmented regulations, and weak enforcement mechanisms. The present study, adopting a descriptive–analytical and comparative approach, examines the legal and economic challenges of risk allocation in Build–Operate–Transfer contracts and compares the legal status of Iran with selected legal systems and successful international experiences. In this study, while explaining the concept and categories of legal, financial, and operational risks in Build–Operate–Transfer contracts, the theoretical foundations of risk allocation from the perspectives of contract law and economic analysis of projects have also been explored. The findings of the study indicate that in Iran, the absence of a coherent and transparent legal framework for the determination and distribution of risks has resulted in the disproportionate transfer of risks to the private sector or, conversely, the imposition of unpredictable obligations upon the government, thereby reducing the economic efficiency of projects. In contrast, the examination of comparative experiences demonstrates that successful legal systems, relying on principles such as allocating risk to the party capable of controlling it, contractual transparency, and the integration of cost–benefit analysis with legal rules, have been able to establish a relative balance between public interests and the incentives of private investors. Ultimately, emphasizing the necessity of revising Iran’s legislative and contractual policies, the study proposes that, through a carefully considered adaptation of comparative models and the integration of legal and economic considerations, an indigenous framework for balanced risk allocation in Build–Operate–Transfer contracts should be designed in order to facilitate sustainable investment attraction and reduce contractual disputes.