Analysis of the Strengths and Weaknesses of Iraq’s Security Agreements with Emphasis on Institutional, Intelligence, Border, and Political–Economic Dimensions

Abstract

Iraq’s regional security over the past two decades has been directly influenced by the consequences of the 2003 war, the emergence of ISIS, and extra-regional interventions, making it one of the central themes of Middle Eastern security studies. The present study aims to identify and analyze the strengths and weaknesses of Iraq’s security agreements with its neighboring countries in four dimensions—institutional, intelligence, border, and political–economic—and seeks, through a descriptive–analytical approach, to evaluate the effectiveness of these agreements in achieving the goals of collective security and regional cooperation. The research data were collected through documentary analysis and a researcher-made questionnaire. The statistical population consisted of 80 professors, experts, and specialists in international relations and security, whose opinions were assessed using a five-point Likert scale. Statistical results indicated that the overall mean effectiveness of Iraq’s security agreements was 3.39 out of 5; the intelligence dimension obtained the highest mean score (3.51), whereas the border dimension received the lowest (3.31). The qualitative analysis of the data revealed that the strengths of these agreements lie in the establishment of institutional frameworks, the creation of joint intelligence centers, and the relative improvement of regional relations. However, the main weaknesses are rooted in the absence of enforcement guarantees, mutual distrust, weak surveillance technology, corruption, and conflicting geopolitical interests. Overall findings demonstrate that despite progress in institutional development, Iraq’s security agreements have not yet achieved functional institutionalization or consistent implementation. Therefore, the limited effectiveness of these agreements stems from the gap between institutional structure and executive capacity within Iraq’s security governance system. Based on the findings, the successful implementation of security cooperation requires the establishment of a permanent Regional Security Coordination Council, a system for evaluating agreements, and mechanisms for intelligence-based trust-building. In summary, the study concludes that the future of Iraq’s regional security depends on transitioning from a political–symbolic level to an institutional–functional one, and on strengthening three fundamental components—trust, transparency, and institutionalization—in security agreements.