Exploration of the Concept of "Whatness" in the Physics and Substantial Metaphysics of Aristotle

Abstract

The issue of substance is considered one of the most important topics in Aristotle’s philosophy, and understanding it can lead to a better comprehension of the intellectual system of this great Greek philosopher. Aristotle built his philosophy on the recognition of ousia or substance, and all the pillars of his intellectual system, including ontology, epistemology, theology, and cosmology, depend on the essence and form, which in his philosophical system are equivalent to ousia and substance. Thus, it can rightly be said that Aristotle's philosophy is a substantial metaphysics. In Aristotle's metaphysical thought, the essence and whatness always indicate a form of substance, or in other terms, "this thing here." Therefore, the essence and whatness are absolutely predicated upon substance. As Aristotle states in his discussion of definition, the definition pertains solely to substance, and the definition of other categories follows from this. From this perspective, it can be said that whatness pertains only and exclusively to substance, and by this substance, he means substance in its primary sense. Hence, in the present research, we seek to explore Aristotle’s thought regarding the scope and whatness of an object and to show the implications of his theory in physics and metaphysics, addressing the question of whether the whatness of an object is precisely the object and its substance, or something else.