Regulating the Relationship Between Democracy and Political Authority in the Constitutions of Iran and Malaysia: A Comparative Study of the Formation, Distribution, and Control of Power

Mostafa  Motaghian Nejad; Hamidreza Rahmanizadeh Dehkordi

Authors

Mostafa Motaghian Nejad PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran Author https://orcid.org/0009-0006-6827-5942
Hamidreza Rahmanizadeh Dehkordi Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran Corresponding author https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2251-9172

Keywords:

democracy, political authority, comparative constitutional law, separation and balance of powers, horizontal accountability, Islamic Republic of Iran, Malaysia

Abstract

A constitution regulates the relationship between democracy and political authority by determining the manner in which supreme state institutions are constituted, powers are distributed, and oversight mechanisms are established. This article comparatively examines this relationship in the constitutions of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Malaysia. The study was conducted using a qualitative, comparative, and documentary approach, and the relevant provisions of the two constitutions were analyzed through structured and focused comparison along three dimensions: the formation, distribution, and control of authority. The findings indicate that, in Iran, popular participation is connected through multiple electoral channels to a structure characterized by the multi-institutional distribution of authority. The President and members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly are directly elected, the Leader is selected through the Assembly of Experts, and institutional accountability is distributed among parliamentary, judicial, electoral, and supervisory authorities. In Malaysia, the effect of direct voting is concentrated primarily on determining the composition of the House of Representatives; the Prime Minister and Cabinet are formed on the basis of a parliamentary majority, and the continuation of the government depends on maintaining the confidence of Parliament. Political authority is also subject to control through parliamentary, judicial, monarchical, federal, and specialized mechanisms. Accordingly, the Iranian model may be characterized as one of “multi-channel electoral participation, multi-institutional distribution of authority, and formal capacity for multi-authority accountability,” whereas the Malaysian model may be described as one of “parliament-centered representation, cabinet-centered executive authority, and formal capacity for multilevel control.” By introducing the concept of the “institutional chain of power,” the article demonstrates that examining the relationship between democracy and political authority requires consideration of the interconnections among the manner in which holders of power are selected, the scope of their powers, and the mechanisms governing their control and the termination of their tenure

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