The Political Life of Constitutional Amendments: Legal Change in Populist Regimes

Authors

    Bálint Tóth Department of Criminal Law, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary
    Aleksandra Nowak * Department of Criminal Law, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland aleksandra.nowak@uw.edu.pl
    Ayşe Demir Department of Law, Ankara University, Ankara, Turkiye
    Rafael González Department of Public Law, Universidad Central de Venezuela, Caracas, Venezuela
https://doi.org/10.61838/kman.isslp.4.2.27

Keywords:

Populism, constitutional amendments, authoritarian legalism, democratic backsliding, rule of law, judicial independence, constitutional change

Abstract

This article aims to explore how populist regimes strategically employ constitutional amendments to reshape legal and political systems in ways that consolidate power and undermine democratic governance. Using a narrative review approach grounded in descriptive analysis, this study synthesizes academic literature, constitutional texts, and comparative legal developments published between 2021 and 2024. The analysis focuses on selected case studies, including Hungary, Poland, Turkey, and Venezuela, chosen for their significant experiences with constitutional change under populist leadership. Key themes were identified through thematic coding of scholarly sources, legal provisions, and political discourse related to constitutional amendments. The analysis reveals four recurring patterns in how populist regimes utilize constitutional amendments. First, amendments are politicized and presented as expressions of the popular will, often through referendums that mask undemocratic intentions. Second, executive powers are expanded by weakening checks and balances, abolishing term limits, and controlling judicial appointments. Third, constitutional language is manipulated to curtail civil liberties, restrict opposition, and codify exclusionary ideologies. Finally, populist leaders frequently rely on informal mechanisms and legal reinterpretation to bypass formal amendment processes, resulting in a deconstitutionalization of governance. These strategies erode judicial independence, diminish public accountability, and foster an environment where the rule of law is subordinated to political objectives. Populist constitutional amendments present a serious challenge to democratic institutions by weaponizing legal reform to entrench authoritarian practices. Understanding these amendments in their broader political context is essential for recognizing and resisting democratic erosion. While courts, international organizations, and civil society can serve as counterweights, their effectiveness depends on institutional resilience and sustained civic engagement. This study underscores the urgent need for vigilance and normative clarity in defending constitutional democracy against populist distortion.

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Published

2025-04-10

Submitted

2025-01-29

Revised

2025-03-22

Accepted

2025-04-02

How to Cite

Tóth, B., Nowak, A., Demir, A., & González, R. (2025). The Political Life of Constitutional Amendments: Legal Change in Populist Regimes. Interdisciplinary Studies in Society, Law, and Politics, 4(2), 315-324. https://doi.org/10.61838/kman.isslp.4.2.27

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