<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<ArticleSet>
  <Article>
    <Journal>
      <PublisherName>KMAN Publication Incorporation</PublisherName>
      <JournalTitle>Interdisciplinary Studies in Society, Law, and Politics</JournalTitle>
      <Issn>3060-5687</Issn>
      <Volume></Volume>
      <Issue>In Press</Issue>
      <PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
        <Year>2027</Year>
        <Month>09</Month>
        <Day>01</Day>
      </PubDate>
    </Journal>
    <ArticleTitle>The Effectiveness of Mechanisms for Ensuring the Implementation of Security Council Decisions and International Court of Justice Judgments in International Law: From Legal Obligation to Political Reality</ArticleTitle>
    <VernacularTitle>The Effectiveness of Mechanisms for Ensuring the Implementation of Security Council Decisions and International Court of Justice Judgments in International Law: From Legal Obligation to Political Reality</VernacularTitle>
    <FirstPage>1</FirstPage>
    <LastPage>16</LastPage>
    <Language>EN</Language>
    <AuthorList>
      <Author>
        <FirstName></FirstName>
        <LastName></LastName>
        <Affiliation></Affiliation>
      </Author>
      <Author>
        <FirstName></FirstName>
        <LastName></LastName>
        <Affiliation></Affiliation>
      </Author>
    </AuthorList>
    <PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
    <History>
      <PubDate PubStatus="received">
        <Year>2026</Year>
        <Month>05</Month>
        <Day>10</Day>
      </PubDate>
    </History>
    <Abstract>&lt;p&gt;Decisions of international institutions can effectively regulate international relations only when an effective link exists between their legal bindingness and their practical implementation. This study aims to comparatively examine the binding and enforcement powers of decisions issued by the International Court of Justice and the Security Council, and to explain the factors contributing to the gap between their legal obligation and practical implementation. Using a descriptive–analytical method and a comparative approach, and drawing on library sources and international legal documents, the study examines the foundations of bindingness, the scope of effects, mechanisms for ensuring implementation, and the extent to which the two institutions are influenced by international politics. The findings indicate that the Security Council, particularly within the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, possesses broader enforcement and coercive instruments and, in this respect, has greater capacity to ensure the implementation of its decisions. In contrast, the contentious judgments of the Court are legally binding; however, their implementation depends on the cooperation and political will of States and, in specific cases, on the capacity of the Security Council. Nevertheless, the Security Council’s enforcement superiority is constrained by the veto power, the interests of major powers, and the selective nature of its decisions. Consequently, strengthening oversight, institutional cooperation, and non-coercive mechanisms may reduce the gap between the legal obligation and practical implementation of international decisions.&lt;/p&gt;</Abstract>
    <ObjectList>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value">International Court of Justice</Param>
      </Object>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value">Security Council</Param>
      </Object>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value">binding decisions</Param>
      </Object>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value">implementation of international decisions</Param>
      </Object>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value">enforcement mechanisms</Param>
      </Object>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value"> veto power</Param>
      </Object>
      <Object Type="keyword">
        <Param Name="value">international law</Param>
      </Object>
    </ObjectList>
    <ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://journalisslp.com/index.php/isslp/article/download/562/1106</ArchiveCopySource>
  </Article>
</ArticleSet>
