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Original Research

The Role of Foreign Intelligence Organizations in Military and Paramilitary Incidents of the Islamic Republic of Iran

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Received: 2026-03-02 **Revised:** 2026-07-07 **Accepted:** 2026-07-15 **Published:** 2026-09-01

Following its establishment in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently attracted the attention of foreign intelligence organizations due to its geopolitical position, defensive capabilities, intelligence dominance, and strategic role in the West Asia region. The purpose of this study is to examine the role of foreign intelligence organizations in military and paramilitary incidents involving the Islamic Republic of Iran. Data were collected through documentary and library-based sources, and the research employed a descriptive–analytical approach. This study seeks to answer the following question: What is the role of foreign intelligence organizations in military and paramilitary incidents involving the Islamic Republic of Iran? The findings indicate that the role of foreign intelligence organizations in such incidents has included intelligence gathering, planning, direction, and support (intelligence, military, and financial) aimed at overthrowing the ruling system. These incidents have generally been accompanied by intensive psychological warfare and various forms of pressure, including economic, military, and political sanctions. Espionage activities (in accordance with the law of criminal saturation and supersaturation) intensify during military and paramilitary incidents. The escalation of espionage activities during such events is primarily driven by the need for information to achieve victory. It is evident that the leadership authority, national cohesion, intelligence superiority, and military power of the Islamic Republic of Iran contribute significantly to neutralizing further conspiracies orchestrated by foreign intelligence organizations.

Keywords: *Intelligence, Espionage, Military and Paramilitary Incidents.*

How to cite this article:

Ali Doosti, M., Saed, M. J., & Najafi Tavana, A. (2026The Role of Foreign Intelligence Organizations in Military and Paramilitary Incidents of the Islamic Republic of Iran. *Interdisciplinary Studies in Society, Law, and Politics, 5*(5), 1-11. https://doi.org/10.61838/kman.isslp.489

1. Introduction

Today, intelligence is recognized as one of the most important components of power. Access to the hidden information of other countries has been among the aspirations of states from the past to the present. Decision-makers in ancient empires, like various forms of government in the Middle Ages, had intelligence systems. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Mongols also possessed an active and offensive espionage system. Until the emergence of large national states after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, intelligence systems had not acquired a modern form; after this period, these organizations gradually took on their modern structure. During this era, foreign ministers and state cabinets devoted most of their efforts to acquiring information that significantly contributed to enhancing national power, especially military intelligence. With the outbreak of World War I, Europe became a scene of espionage networks (Rowan, 1931). Evidence has shown that the intelligence activities of espionage organizations have become more complex than in the past. Awareness of the hostile intentions and defensive capabilities of enemies is essential for the proper management of

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military and paramilitary incidents. Espionage organizations damage the security and national interests of other countries through intelligence gathering. On the one hand, these organizations seek to ensure the national security of their own countries; on the other hand, they seek to violate the national security of target countries. Intelligence services, as the principal designers and executors of espionage operations, collect information in accordance with the prevailing conditions of countries. The harmful effects of espionage activities increase the necessity of countering and preventing this phenomenon. What has been stated indicates the threats posed by espionage organizations. Awareness of these threats demonstrates the importance and necessity of examining the role of foreign intelligence organizations in military and paramilitary incidents involving the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has constantly been exposed to harm by foreign intelligence organizations. Historical evidence has shown that the victims of military and paramilitary incidents involving the Islamic Republic of Iran have belonged to different social groups, including ordinary citizens, military personnel, and civilian officials. This study seeks to examine the role of foreign intelligence services in military and paramilitary incidents involving the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Significance of the Study: This study can assist the country's intelligence community in developing security plans consistent with modern information and communication technologies, and it can assist the legislature in formulating deterrent laws.

Necessity of the Study: The necessity of this study lies in the intensification of security threats and conspiracies by foreign intelligence services, particularly those of the United States and the Zionist regime, in recent years.

Research Question: What is the role of foreign intelligence organizations in military and paramilitary incidents involving the Islamic Republic of Iran?

Research Hypothesis: It seems that the role of espionage organizations in military and paramilitary incidents involving the Islamic Republic of Iran is to attempt to collect intelligence with the aim of violating the country's national security.

2. Theoretical Foundations

A) Concepts

Espionage: The lexical root of espionage in Persian refers to curiosity, investigation, inquiry, and seeking information about people's hidden affairs (Gharib, 1987). Espionage has been defined as follows: "spy" is an Arabic adjective meaning informer, tale-bearer, seeker of information, or someone who obtains the news and secrets of a person, office, or country and informs another party about them (Amid, 2012). In technical terms, "espionage refers to the act of a person who, under false and fraudulent titles, obtains information, maps, documents, or confidential records related to military, economic, and political secrets and submits them to a foreign country" (Sarikhani, 1999). "Espionage may be defined as the deceptive collection of information, knowingly and at the request of a hostile state or organization, or the conduct of those suspected of collecting information for such a purpose" (Demarest, 1996). Experts in the field of intelligence have defined espionage as follows: "Espionage refers to a directed activity whose purpose is to acquire information of intelligence value secretly and covertly. Espionage is regarded as an unlawful act against another country" (Watson, 1958). "Espionage is conduct accompanied by secrecy and concealment. Espionage necessarily involves intrusion into a prohibited domain, which entails punishment because of the violation of law. Espionage requires acceptance of risks that may even endanger the spy's life" (Cooper & Dellinger, 2001).

Spy: A spy means a hearer and derives from the root "to hear"; it is an intensive form meaning one who listens excessively, spies, and seekers of information (Gharib, 1987). In technical terms, a spy is a person who, under false and covert titles, seeks to obtain information or objects in favor of the enemy (Goldouzian, 1990). In legal terminology, a spy is someone who secretly or under false titles performs an act in favor of the enemy to obtain information or collect objects (Jafari Langroudi, 2009). "A spy is a person who illegally traffics in confidential information or anything valuable under strict protection, or induces others to secretly provide information contrary to the interests of their own organization" (Cooper & Dellinger, 2001). According to intelligence experts, a spy is an individual who betrays with full awareness of what he or she is doing (Asthana & Nirmal, 2009).

Intelligence: Lexically, the word "information" derives from the root meaning emergence or becoming manifest,

accompanied by a form of elevation and superiority over something (Farahidi, 1988). In technical terms, "intelligence is a set of knowledge needed by policymakers or policy formulators that is useful for decision-making; from the premises of such intelligence, categories such as national security and national interests may be derived" (Saeedi & Salehi, 2019). "Information consists of organized data placed within a meaningful pattern to which other data are added. In other words, intelligence is the knowledge of processing organized data and making them meaningful in such a way that they can be prepared for the analysis of confidential information" (Zandi, 2007). Intelligence is a process through which specific types of information relevant to national security are collected and analyzed and then provided to policymakers (Lowenthal, 2002).

National Security: The category of "security" has a history as long as human life. One of the concerns of human beings in earlier times was the provision of security. Experts in security studies have offered various definitions of national security. Walter Lippmann first defined the term national security as follows: "A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and, if necessary, is able to preserve its legitimate interests by fighting" (Lippmann, 1943). Arnold Wolfers described security as an important sign and symbol and referred to its potential ambiguity and to its use by politicians. Therefore, this conceptual ambiguity may have important political consequences, because reference to security requirements may be used to justify exceptional measures. Wolfers argued that "security, in an objective sense, indicates the absence of threats to acquired values, and in a subjective sense, indicates the absence of fear and anxiety regarding attacks against those values" (Wolfers, 1952). Barry Buzan, quoting Frank N. Trager, states that "national security is that part of government policy whose objective is to create favorable national and international political conditions for the expansion and strengthening of national life values against existing adversaries and potential enemies" (Buzan, 1991).

B) Research Background

No domestic study has so far been found on the role of foreign intelligence organizations in military and paramilitary incidents involving the Islamic Republic of Iran. Foreign sources related to the stated topic include the following:

Herman, a professional officer of the British intelligence organization, in a book entitled *Intelligence Services and National Security: Intelligence Power in War*, examined and explained the concept of intelligence and its determining indicators and sought to investigate the effects and consequences of intelligence activities in different dimensions of statecraft and policymaking at the national and international levels, the supervisory role of intelligence, and its effect on passive protection of classified places and documents (Herman, 2014). James E. Adams, in a book entitled *The New Spies*, wrote this work after the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, when intelligence communities throughout the world had been shocked and bewildered. This book addresses changes in the structure of the former Soviet intelligence organization, the mission of the FBI as the domestic intelligence and security organization of the United States, the intelligence analysis of the KGB as the intelligence and security organization of Russia, the budget of the CIA, the new intelligence world in Russia, the terrorist operation against the athletes of the Zionist regime at the Munich stadium, the terrorist operation by the Libyan state against the Pan American aircraft over Lockerbie, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and drug trafficking in the United States (Adams, 1998). Turner, in a book entitled *Why Secret Intelligence Fails*, extensively addressed the weaknesses and strengths of intelligence organizations. In this work, he referred to topics such as the historical evolution of intelligence, the American intelligence method, the problems of the American intelligence community, the identification of structural variables in the intelligence systems of democratic countries, intelligence priorities, policymakers' requirements, the risks of intelligence collection, scandals in intelligence analysis, qualified individuals' access to information, the role of counterintelligence, and covert actions (Turner, 2009). Eftekhari and Naderi Asl, in an article entitled "An Analytical Comparison of Protests in Iran, 2013–2023," referred to the armed, violent, and destructive transformation of protests in Iran over a specific period. In this article, the researchers explained different types of protests based on five criteria and ten indicators. The main question of this study concerned the differences and similarities among the protests of 2013 to 2023 in

Iran. A comparison of three widespread protests, namely those of 2017–2018, 2019, and 2022, indicated ten similarities and thirty differences among them. The study showed that over time, the level of protesters' violence, the slope of the duration of protests, the volume of cyberspace production, and the securitization of the nature of protests have been increasing and expanding (Eftekhari & Naderi Asl, 2025).

C) Theoretical Framework

In this study, the role of foreign intelligence services in military and paramilitary incidents involving the Islamic Republic of Iran is to be analyzed and examined through the criterion of the "law of criminal saturation and supersaturation." This law is one of the achievements of Enrico Ferri and had previously been proposed by the Belgian scholar Adolphe Quetelet. This law states: "Crime has a fixed and determinate level in every environment; however, sometimes, because of abnormal conditions such as war, revolution, and hunger, the level of crime suddenly increases. After conditions return to normal, crime also returns to its previous state" (Najafi Tavana, 2018). Ferri examined the general evolution of crime and stated that crime includes a certain number of offenses. As long as ordinary and normal conditions prevail in social life, crime is produced with a specific order and regularity and does not exceed its customary limit, which is the law of saturation. However, during disturbances and accidental disruptions of social life, such as war and famine, this order and regularity are disrupted and cause crime to exceed its customary limit, which is the law of supersaturation (Nourbaha, 1998).

3. Types of Military and Paramilitary Incidents

War: Sun Tzu, the Chinese philosopher and warrior, wrote about the importance of espionage during war as follows: "To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the height of skill. The height of power is to subdue the enemy without fighting. For the Chinese, war means deception and stratagem, deceptive attacks, endless patience and endurance, and, above all, spies whose information reveals the enemy's weaknesses; attacking these points shortens the duration of war or completely eliminates the necessity of war and combat. If you are unaware of both the enemy and yourself, you will certainly fall into danger in every battle. The field of communication with agents who carry information about the enemy is the guarantee of every success. You must seek out those enemy agents who come to spy on you. You must bribe them so that they serve you. Give them the necessary instructions and watch them carefully. In this way, you can recruit double agents and exploit them" (Fialka, 2002). Laqueur wrote about the importance of intelligence during war: "Politicians and national leaders who are unaware of the intentions of their rivals and enemies during war are like blind men. Napoleon repeatedly stated that the importance of a spy serving in a suitable position is no less than the importance of several armies" (Laqueur, 2002). Some intelligence experts believe that wars are appropriate criteria for assessing espionage activities. Wars, as one of the adverse social incidents, create strange events in the world. Research has shown that the number of spies increased during World War II. The reason for this was the effort of the parties involved in the war to collect military intelligence (Herbig & Wiskoff, 2015). According to Abram Shulsky, the most significant failure in wars is an erroneous intelligence understanding of the enemy's situation, which a state or its army applies in a manner contrary to its own interests (Shulsky, 2002). Some military leaders attribute their victory in wars to espionage activities. Victory in war is a clear objective. Intelligence plays a specific role in understanding the enemy. The importance of intelligence during war is greater than during peace because it attracts more capabilities. The criteria for evaluating intelligence concern human casualties, financial losses, territory, and time in the arithmetic of war. A British historian, regarding the effect of intelligence during World War II, argued that codebreaking by Britain and the United States, meaning access to another party's hidden information through decryption, shortened the war in Europe by three to four years (Herman, 2014). The role of the American intelligence organization in Iraq's imposed war against the Islamic Republic of Iran became clear in the early days of the war, because immediately after the beginning of the imposed war in 1980, the United States removed Iraq from the list of terrorist countries and secretly provided the Baath Party with various military equipment, including ammunition, different computers, spare parts, and defensive electronic devices. In addition, it provided the Iraqi government with extensive information concerning Iran, such as highly confidential satellite images and airborne warnings. Because it possessed these facilities, the Iraqi

army was able to observe suspicious matters in real time in the sky. The United States secretly and under the cover of agricultural loans, and later through the Atlanta branch of the National Bank of Italy, provided Iraq with financial assistance and important military equipment (Nutter, 2005). The experienced officer of the American intelligence organization, Duane R. Clarridge, wrote in his memoirs about the intelligence support of this organization for the then president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein: "In early spring 1986, at the height of the bloody Iraq–Iran conflict, I secretly traveled to Baghdad hoping to meet the Iraqi dictator. The Iranians' firmness and religion-based foreign policy, together with the possibility of Iraq's defeat in the war, caused concern and led to full American support. American support for Iraq was intended to keep that country's war machine functioning. We provided Iraq with our information so that it could use it in combat operations, especially air warfare" (Clarridge, 2008). After the end of the Iran–Iraq War, the Americans decided to overthrow Saddam Hussein because of his refusal to implement their policies. Under the pretext that the Iraqi government had acquired weapons of mass destruction and based on baseless claims by Western intelligence services, they attacked that country, although their evidence in this regard was unfounded and ambiguous (Turner, 2009). The role of the American intelligence organization in the twelve-day war of the Zionist regime against the Islamic Republic of Iran is quite evident. This war showed that many of the damages inflicted on the Islamic Republic of Iran resulted from emerging sciences and technologies used in intelligence and military fields by the Americans. The monitoring of the complex and nonlinear cooperation of American military startups is undeniable. These collaborations, as a result of information sharing with the Zionist regime, turned into a destructive and devastating machine. This development attracted even more attention with the addition of the names of Elon Musk's companies and other prominent figures in the field of technology. The recent collaborations of Palantir and Anduril indicate entry into a new stage in the development of intelligence and military technologies. These two companies, by focusing on artificial intelligence and battlefield data analysis, have strengthened the foundations of transformation in the defense resources of the United States. With the emergence of these technologies, we are witnessing the beginning of the sixth generation of wars, where artificial intelligence and data-centricity replace traditional tactics and significantly assist in tracking and launching missiles and identifying intended targets for bombardment (Rasa Monitoring Intelligence Organizations, 2025).

Coup: The historical background of coups has shown that the main actors in such incidents have always been intelligence organizations. Intelligence organizations organize and support military and paramilitary operations in other countries through the recruitment of human agents and infiltration of their targets (Grey, 2018). Throughout history, powerful countries have always sought to preserve their interests. Achieving these objectives is sometimes realized through occupying the territory of potential enemies and, in some cases, through creating buffer zones or supporting the integrity of such zones. Another, more complex method is the imposition of allied regimes on another country through a hard or soft coup. After World War II, from 1945 to 1986, more than 100 successful and unsuccessful coups occurred in different parts of the world, most of which were not directly related to the Cold War. Other studies indicate that from 1945 to 1986, more than 300 successful and unsuccessful coups occurred in different parts of the world, in which intelligence organizations, particularly Russian and American intelligence organizations, played direct and indirect roles in their design and implementation. It may be stated with confidence that coups usually occur in small and unstable countries (Nutter, 2005). Historical evidence has shown that after the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the American intelligence organization, as in the August 19, 1953 coup against the legal government of Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh, played a prominent role in Iran's military and paramilitary incidents. The Nojeh coup, directed by the American intelligence organization and led by Shapour Bakhtiar, one of the leaders of the National Front and the last prime minister of the Pahlavi regime, with the cooperation of some of their internal and external agents, began from Shahid Nojeh Air Base in Hamedan on July 9, 1980. Because the coup plot was exposed, the coup failed, and a number of its agents were arrested or killed (Taheri, 2014). The Americans were hopeful about victory in the Nojeh coup, believing that they could deal a fatal blow to the newly established system of the

Islamic Republic of Iran. The Americans believed that even if the coup failed, they would have achieved their objectives, because this event would weaken the army, especially the air force, for their next plan: Iraq's imposed war against Iran on September 22, 1980 (Farsinejad, 2009).

Assassination: Shulsky, quoting Shlomo Gazit, writes: "Few terrorist organizations are able to operate within a completely closed domain and not rely on networks of local supporters. These supporters, because of ideological motivation or fear, provide them with intelligence assistance without direct involvement in terrorist operations. The importance of infiltration into support structures lies in the fact that infiltrating them is easier than infiltrating terrorist organizations themselves, even very closed ones. By infiltrating these support structures, it may be possible to infiltrate the terrorist organization itself or to obtain indirect information about it" (Shulsky, 2002). John Deutch, then director of the CIA, stated in a 1996 speech that the CIA had extensively recruited and trained spies to identify terrorist networks in different countries. He claimed that over the previous two years, the CIA had assisted foreign governments in five stages in arresting suspects (Treverton, 2011). After the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, most assassinations in this country were carried out by members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization, with the support and backing of Western intelligence organizations, especially the American intelligence organization. This terrorist group assassinated different members of society, including women, children, clerics, and high-ranking civilian and military officials. The explosion at the central office of the Islamic Republican Party on June 28, 1981, was carried out by one of the infiltrating agents of this terrorist group, Mohammad Reza Kolahi. In this incident, Ayatollah Dr. Mohammad Hosseini Beheshti and 72 of his companions were martyred. The explosion at the central office of the Islamic Republican Party occurred exactly a few days after the vote of the Islamic Consultative Assembly declaring the political incompetence of Bani-Sadr (Kavoshi, 2009). After the beginning of Iraq's imposed war against Iran, the Mojahedin-e Khalq, under the direction of Western intelligence organizations, especially the United States, settled in Iraq and continued their activities against the Islamic Republic of Iran under the support of the Baath regime. In Iraq, they maintained close cooperation with that country's intelligence organization. In this regard, they collected intelligence through their agents in Iran for the Baath regime. The Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization transferred its structures and central leadership to Iraq in 1986 and thereafter came under the financial, logistical, and propaganda support of the Baath regime. On July 25, 1988, one week after Iran accepted United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, this organization invaded Iranian territory with its military forces and full equipment provided by the Baath regime of Iraq under the name Eternal Light. The humiliating defeat of the Mojahedin-e Khalq in Operation Mersad and the killing of approximately 1,600 to 2,000 of its members severely damaged their morale. After this operation, they became increasingly isolated (Ghadre Velayat & Artistic, 2012). Another terrorist group in Iran is the Jundallah group. The leader of this group, whose real name was Abdolmajid and whose alias was Abdolmalek Rigi, belonged to the Sunni and Baluch Rigi tribe. Following this group's suicide attack on October 18, 2009, in Sistan and Baluchestan, which led to the martyrdom of several commanders and other members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the then minister of intelligence, Heydar Moslehi, while announcing the dispatch of a special delegation to Pakistan to pursue the matter, stated: "A delegation is scheduled to travel to Pakistan to pursue this issue. There is very good evidence and indications showing that the actions of Abdolmalek Rigi, the leader of the group that has claimed responsibility for the suicide attack in Sistan and Baluchestan, are connected to Pakistan's intelligence apparatus." The Americans always publicly condemned Jundallah's terrorist attacks in Iran, but the revelations of Seymour Hersh, the controversial researcher and reporter for *The New Yorker*, who had previously exposed the events of Abu Ghraib prison, indicated practical and covert American support. This prominent American journalist and researcher revealed that the United States had provided 400 million dollars to paramilitary groups, including Jundallah, to overthrow the Iranian government. He further added that the plan for 400 million dollars in American financial assistance had been prepared as part of a Bush administration plan to pay anti-Iran groups to carry out sabotage actions (Koushki, 2016).

Insurrection: Inciting people to revolt is one of the techniques of intelligence services. The effectiveness of such an action is important because of its low investment and high return. A hostile country can easily take control of the fate of a nation by involving the target country in different fronts, such as public order and security, sectarian issues, and political and economic matters. If existing conditions in the target country incite individuals to revolt, then covert foreign intelligence support for the insurgents will be highly effective for the hostile country. In such a situation, in addition to winning public support for the insurgents, they provide for their financial and arms needs. In other words, the hostile state must provide all the financial and logistical needs of the insurgents. The objective of the intelligence organizations of hostile states in insurrections is mainly to damage the credibility and popularity of the target government in order to overthrow it (Asthana & Nirmal, 2009). Insurrections appear in the form of guerrilla or partisan wars carried out by paramilitary groups. The strategy of guerrilla warfare is to dominate part of a country, expand territorial control, damage the image of the ruling regime among the people, and weaken the supporters of the state. In guerrilla warfare, creating a sense of indifference among people toward the fate of the government is a serious issue (Alavi, 2000). The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan is one of the insurgent groups that was formed by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in 1945, under the slogan of supporting workers and fighting feudal lords, in order to organize separatist uprisings in Azerbaijan and other northern cities of Iran. The issue of annexing Iranian Azerbaijan to Soviet Azerbaijan was among the missions assigned to the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. In a completely confidential plan, the Communist Party of Azerbaijan had envisaged the formation of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan to send representatives to the National Consultative Assembly (Naeimi, 2020). After the formation of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, the Russians made various promises to the leaders of this party. Many of these promises were quickly fulfilled, such that the Kurds succeeded in obtaining facilities from the Russians, including light weapons, ammunition, a mobile radio device, and a printing press. The Russians demonstrated their commitment to Kurdish autonomy by preventing the deployment of the Iranian army to the northern circuit of Saqqez, Baneh, and Sardasht (Naeimi, 2020). The first overthrow project in Iran occurred exactly six days after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, following the uprising of the Kurds of Kurdistan by the Democratic Party on February 17, 1979, with the support and backing of Western intelligence organizations. In this unrest, the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, with the support of intelligence services, disarmed and looted large quantities of weapons and ammunition from the garrisons of Mahabad, Paveh, and Piranshahr. This unrest occurred through the role of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan alongside groups and organizations such as the Arab People's Organization, the Komala Party, and the Muslim Arab People's group (Totounchian, 2010). The Komala Party, or the Organization of Toilers of Kurdistan, also revolted in the cities of Kurdistan immediately a few days after the victory of the Islamic Revolution. This group had been formed in 1969 with a communist ideology and the slogan of supporting workers and fighting feudal lords, and it was struck by SAVAK in the early 1970s. Members of this party revolted in Saqqez on February 15, 1979, and their leader was killed after a clash with police forces. They publicly issued the first official statement of the party on the day of their leader's funeral. In order to achieve independence, this group expanded its organization throughout Kurdistan by establishing numerous bases and placed attacks on military and law-enforcement centers on its agenda. Repeated clashes between this group and the military forces of Kurdistan weakened it, and after becoming aware of the group's anti-religious ideas, the religious segment of Kurdistan also withdrew from further cooperation with it (Naeimi, 2020).

Revolution: Revolution is the illegal and usually violent seizure of power that leads to fundamental transformation and change in the institutions of government. The concept of revolution is used in various forms and meanings. Sometimes this term is used to describe sudden fundamental transformations, whether violent or nonviolent. At times, fundamental changes in government that occur through elections and without any violent behavior are also described as revolution (Berkowitz & Bock, 1996). Intelligence services generally implement their programs and intentions in other countries through front companies. The Soros

Foundation, affiliated with the United States and the Zionist regime, has active offices in more than 30 countries around the world. By establishing study centers in countries and evaluating opponents of the central government, this foundation supports their press and prepares the ground for a quiet revolution in those countries. The majority of the activities of this foundation are in Central Asian and Caucasus countries. The foundation first expanded its activities in Central Asia in 1997 after the financial and economic bankruptcy of Southeast Asian countries and established offices in the countries of this region under the title of open society. The purpose of establishing these offices was to design and implement velvet revolutions in target countries and change their political systems. The Soros Foundation is considered the unofficial arm of the CIA and Mossad in different countries (Abdollahi, 2011). Evidence has shown that Britain and the United States have the longest history of espionage in Iran. The involvement of the American intelligence organization in Iran-related matters dates back to the mid-1940s. From this period onward, because of their understanding of Iran's financial situation and strategic position, and because of concern over communist influence in Iran, the Americans intensified their presence in the country. Relations between the two countries in the 1960s took the form of clientelism, and in the 1970s they took the form of consolidation and dependence. During this period, the Iranian government acted as a military and political client of the United States (Khodaverdi, 2009). In August 1978, the American intelligence organization announced, based on its intelligence assessment, that "Iran is not on the verge of revolution or pre-revolutionary incidents." On September 28, 1978, the United States Defense Intelligence Agency stated in a report: "The Shah is expected to remain actively in power for another ten years." At that time, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the United States Department of State did not even have a full-time analyst on Iranian affairs. Therefore, it published no report about the Iranian Revolution. Since 1978, analysts in the American intelligence community devoted considerable time to preparing intelligence reports and analyses on Iran-related issues, but these produced no result. Of course, individuals such as Harold Saunders, John D. Stempel, and other experts with experience in Iranian affairs believed that the problem was broader and more serious. They agreed that Iran had become highly vulnerable. On the other hand, in 1977, no one inside or outside the government predicted that the events in Iran would lead to the fall of the Shah. Existing documents related to the American embassy indicate contacts with opponents of the Shah, but there is no sign of contact with extremist clerics. Some reports received from Tehran predicted Iran's future events, while others were completely mistaken. Policymakers were unable to select correctly among conflicting assessments. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that insufficient attention was paid to political Islam in the case of the events related to the Islamic Revolution of Iran. Policymakers and political officials at the time believed that because the Shah had safely passed through previous conflicts and crises, he would not face a serious problem in these events either, and that the new middle class, including the bazaar, would stand against the revolutionary movement (Laqueur, 2002). After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the American intelligence organization began to incite Arab rulers in the region to confront the Islamic Republic of Iran. With the help of these countries, this organization established a security system to contain Iran. To achieve this objective, the Gulf Cooperation Council was formed in Riyadh in February 1981 with the participation of the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. Most of its decisions concerned the exchange of intelligence cooperation on security issues, the air defense network, and the creation of a rapid reaction force under American support. At the suggestion of the Americans, this council was used as a third pillar to create an obstacle against Iran. The Americans sought to instill in the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council the idea that Iran intended to dominate the region and seize the Persian Gulf as an Iranian sea. For this reason, the rapid reaction force of the Gulf Cooperation Council, under the support of the American rapid reaction force, became active in controlling small conflicts and suppressing internal and regional movements (Taheri, 2014).

4. Conclusion

The title of the present study is "The Role of Foreign Intelligence Organizations in Military and Paramilitary Incidents of the Islamic Republic of Iran." The research question is: What is the role of espionage organizations

in military and paramilitary incidents involving Iran? According to the research hypothesis, it seems that the role of foreign intelligence organizations in military and paramilitary incidents involving the Islamic Republic of Iran is to attempt to collect intelligence with the aim of violating the country's national security and overthrowing the ruling system of this country. The findings of this study, based on the criterion of the "law of criminal saturation and supersaturation," have shown that the activities of espionage organizations intensify during military and paramilitary incidents involving the Islamic Republic of Iran. The reason for the intensification of espionage activities during such incidents is the enemies' need for information to achieve victory. The more severe the crises are, the greater the importance and speed of information exchange become. In such a situation, the efforts of espionage organizations to collect information, manage psychological warfare, spread rumors, alter the regional balance of power, conduct intelligence infiltration, design intelligence operations, and influence macro-level decisions become intensified. Under such conditions, foreign intelligence organizations are not only responsible for collecting intelligence but are also active actors in presenting targeted and biased plans to damage the country's national security. In order to harm the system and achieve their objectives, these organizations train, provide weapons, supply financial resources, and operationally direct groups and parties opposed to the system, the result of which is the formation of short-term and long-term crises; several examples of these cases have been mentioned in this study. Espionage organizations mainly seek assistance from groups opposed to the system to obtain the information they need and to implement their operational plans. Because of their familiarity with the country's internal conditions and circumstances, these groups have considerable capacity to collect military and nonmilitary information. Espionage organizations have so far used various tools, including assassination, war, insurrection, coup, and terrorism, to overthrow the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, but they have failed because they lack a social base among the people. The miscalculations of the analysts of these organizations are the main reason for their failure in military and paramilitary incidents, because they imagine that the Iranian people will accompany them in such incidents. Examples include the failure of the Nojeh coup in 1980, the victory of the Iranian nation in the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the defeat of the Mojahedin-e Khalq in Operation Mersad in 1988, and the two recent wars of the United States and the Zionist regime against the Islamic Republic of Iran, which failed because of the perseverance and resistance of the Iranian nation and the ruling system in Iran. Since the system of the Islamic Republic originates from Islamic values with the characteristics of religious democracy, it has always resisted other conspiracies by intelligence organizations and emerged with dignity.

5. Recommendations

1. In order to reduce the formation of military and paramilitary incidents, in addition to monitoring intelligence activities, mechanisms for prevention and crisis management should be designed. These measures include enhancing defense capacity, intensifying intelligence collection, both domestic and foreign, to achieve intelligence superiority, formulating preventive strategies in the field of domestic and international security, and training analysts to identify unevaluated information.
2. A deep understanding of the role of intelligence services in military and paramilitary incidents and efforts toward intelligent interaction with them will help ensure sustainable security and regional stability.
3. Efforts should be made to preserve unity and national cohesion under the wise guidance of the Supreme Leader in order to neutralize the anti-security actions of foreign intelligence services.
4. Efforts should be made to preserve and sustain public support.

Authors' Contributions

Authors contributed equally to this article.

Declaration

In order to correct and improve the academic writing of our paper, we have used the language model ChatGPT.

Transparency Statement

Data are available for research purposes upon reasonable request to the corresponding author.

Acknowledgments

We would like to express our gratitude to all individuals helped us to do the project.

Declaration of Interest

The authors report no conflict of interest.

Funding

According to the authors, this article has no financial support.

Ethical Considerations

In this research, ethical standards including obtaining informed consent, ensuring privacy and confidentiality were observed.

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