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The Role of Security Departments in Crime Prevention

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1. Round 1

1.1. Reviewer 1

Reviewer:

The paragraph in Section 2 stating that "the negative mental associations and personal perceptions of security-related matters among the public" constituted a post-Revolutionary challenge is historically plausible but analytically underdeveloped. The authors should specify the evidentiary basis for this claim. Was this conclusion derived from archival records, government documents, memoirs, academic historical studies, or contemporaneous public opinion? The reference to employees who had been "exposed to the security units and offices affiliated with SAVAK" also requires a more nuanced distinction between pre-Revolutionary intelligence structures and post-Revolutionary administrative protection offices. The authors should avoid implying institutional continuity solely on the basis of public perceptions and instead analyze the extent of legal, organizational, personnel, and functional continuity or discontinuity between the two systems.

The paragraph stating that "According to Hussein Fardoost, one of the founders of SAVAK, the sources and frameworks underlying these security regulations and structures consisted of a combination of CIA and FBI regulations" requires more rigorous source criticism. Memoirs and retrospective accounts by politically significant actors should not be treated as self-validating historical evidence. The authors should provide the exact source, publication details, relevant page, and, if possible, corroborating archival or scholarly evidence. They should also distinguish between the influence of foreign advisers on SAVAK's intelligence structure and the specific regulatory framework governing administrative security departments. The present wording risks overgeneralization because the relationship between CIA/FBI models and the specific "security regulations and structures" discussed in the article is asserted but not demonstrated.

The paragraph stating that "until 1956, there were no codified laws, regulations, or clearly defined responsibilities relating to security matters" is an absolute historical claim and therefore requires careful qualification. The authors should clarify whether they mean there were no comprehensive administrative protection regulations, no institution formally bearing the

relevant title, or no security-related legal provisions whatsoever. Iran had earlier criminal, military, bureaucratic, and state-secrecy mechanisms that may complicate such a categorical statement. The paragraph should therefore specify the documentary scope of the historical review and identify the archival or legislative corpus examined. A chronological table of major laws, regulations, institutional changes, and their respective functions from the late Pahlavi period through the post-Revolutionary period would significantly strengthen this section.

The paragraph in Section 4 listing "Surveillance Systems (CCTV)," "Access Control Gates," "Cybersecurity Systems," "Hazardous Material Detection Systems," and "Personal Protective Equipment" appears detached from the preceding legal and criminological discussion and requires substantial restructuring. The authors should explain whether these tools are actually used by Iranian organizational security departments, whether they are mandated or recommended by specific standards, and which categories of crime or security threat each tool is intended to prevent. The inclusion of "bulletproof vests," "tear gas," X-ray machines, biometric systems, and cybersecurity controls in one undifferentiated list conflates physical security, occupational safety, law-enforcement equipment, access control, and information security. A more scientific presentation would classify tools by security domain, identify their legal authorization, assess proportionality and privacy implications, and connect each category to specific preventive objectives.

The paragraph in Section 5 stating that security departments must comply with "the GDPR," "the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act," "the UK Bribery Act," and "OSHA" raises a serious jurisdictional relevance problem. The article is explicitly focused on security departments within the Islamic Republic of Iran, yet the manuscript introduces foreign regulatory regimes without explaining their applicability. Unless the study is comparative, these references should either be removed or clearly presented as international benchmarks rather than binding standards. The authors should prioritize Iranian legislation governing classified information, administrative violations, anti-corruption, privacy and data protection, public employment, cybersecurity, access to information, and organizational security. If international standards such as ISO/IEC 27001 are retained, their status as voluntary or sector-specific standards should be clarified. This section should be legally anchored in the jurisdiction under study.

Authors revised the manuscript and uploaded the document.

1.2. Reviewer 2

Reviewer:

The paragraph beginning "In 1956, by order of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, a commission known as the 'Permanent Protection Commission'" contains a potentially valuable legal-historical chronology, but the manuscript should provide exact titles and promulgation details of the regulations and statutes mentioned. The authors refer to the "Penal Code for the Publication and Disclosure of Confidential and Classified Documents," the "Penal Code for Disrupting the Oil Industry in Iran," and the "Law for the Formation of the Oil Industry Guard," yet no dates, article numbers, or legislative references are supplied. For a manuscript dealing substantially with institutional law, such details are essential. The authors should also explain how each statute contributed specifically to the emergence or powers of administrative security departments rather than merely listing security-related legislation.

The paragraph describing the Fourth Directorate of SAVAK and stating that "whenever individuals were appointed to higher-ranking or managerial positions, the approval of the SAVAK representative, acting as head of security, was required" contains a significant assertion regarding personnel control and political-administrative vetting. The authors should support this claim with primary or authoritative secondary evidence and clarify whether this practice applied universally across ministries and public organizations or only within particular sectors and periods. It would also be useful to compare this historical vetting function with the post-Revolutionary system, explaining what institutional mechanisms were retained, abolished, or redesigned. Such comparative analysis would directly advance the article beyond chronology toward institutional development.

The paragraph stating that "the decree of June 19, 1980, was approved by the Islamic Revolutionary Council and subsequently communicated to all government agencies on July 21, 1980" contains an apparent chronological or conversion

issue that should be verified carefully. The original dates previously shown alongside Persian calendar equivalents do not appear internally consistent, and the manuscript should not retain dual-calendar dates unless they have been accurately converted. The authors should verify the original decree date against the official legal record and use a single consistent dating system throughout the English manuscript, preferably Gregorian dates if required by the journal. More importantly, the legal content of this decree should be summarized: what did it establish, what authority did it confer, which institutions did it cover, and how did it alter the status of existing security offices?

The paragraph in Section 3 stating that protection "involves monitoring and inspecting their activities in order to prevent deviations and potential corruption" needs a stronger rights-based discussion. Monitoring public officials can be justified by integrity and anti-corruption objectives, but it also raises concerns relating to privacy, procedural fairness, proportionality, data protection, and protection against arbitrary surveillance. The article currently treats expanded monitoring as inherently beneficial without discussing legal safeguards. The authors should analyze the limits of security-department powers, including authorization standards, record retention, access controls, complaint mechanisms, independent oversight, and remedies for abuse. A scientifically balanced treatment of organizational security should examine both the preventive benefits and the risks of excessive surveillance or concentration of discretionary authority.

The paragraph referring to Imam Ali and stating that "as individuals move closer to centers of power… the associated risks increase" could provide a useful normative foundation, but it should be integrated more rigorously into the legal-criminological argument. The authors should cite the precise primary Islamic source, explain its interpretive relevance, and distinguish normative ethical principles from empirical criminological propositions. For example, the principle that higher authority requires stronger accountability could be connected to modern concepts of integrity systems, principal-agent theory, abuse-of-office risk, and enhanced scrutiny of high-risk positions. Presently, the paragraph relies on moral authority but does not translate that normative principle into a scientifically articulated preventive mechanism.

Authors revised the manuscript and uploaded the document.

2. Revised

Editor's decision: Accepted.
Editor in Chief's decision: Accepted.