

Analytical Comparison of Two Theological Paradigms: Stoic and Avicenna Perspectives on the Relationship Between God and the World

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In Stoic thought (and specifically, in later Stoicism), God is viewed as the first rational cause, possessing an intrinsic unity with matter and the world. This unity and connection between God and matter result in an overarching rational order that governs the cosmos. In this perspective, God, as the first cause, directly pervades every particle of the universe and guides the natural order of the world from within. In contrast, by examining the Avicennian theology, it becomes apparent that God is a transcendent and immaterial being who influences the material world through intermediaries. Thus, God is not within matter but occupies the highest rank in the chain of causes. The clash of ideas between these two philosophical schools reveals that Avicenna not only aimed to provide a rational explanation of God and the cosmic order in light of Islamic teachings but also, despite ontological similarities with Stoic thought, distinctly demarcated his theological position from theirs. In this regard, the present paper will demonstrate, through a comparative-analytical approach, that although Avicenna aligns with certain Stoic concepts—particularly in the realms of causality, reason, and the cosmic order—he presents a differing viewpoint. By utilizing the argument of necessity and possibility, along with a focus on Islamic metaphysical discussions such as the metaphysical explanation of causality, Avicenna offers a theological perspective that diverges from Stoicism. In this sense, the dialogue between these two philosophical traditions and their interaction may better elucidate the place of Avicennian metaphysical theology and its relationship with the development of Islamic philosophy and the evolution of metaphysical thought in the Islamic world.

Keywords: *Theology, Metaphysical Theology, Avicenna, Stoic Theology.*

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1. Introduction

Avicenna, as one of the greatest philosophers and thinkers in Islamic philosophy, established a comprehensive philosophical and metaphysical system by synthesizing Greek philosophy and Islamic teachings. This system has been extensively studied and examined by scholars. On the other hand, Stoic philosophy, with its

emphasis on rationality and the correspondence of matter with the concept of God as the primary source of order and harmony in the cosmos, has provided important intellectual foundations, some of which can also be found in Avicenna's works. This kind of thought, deeply rooted in Greek culture, particularly during the Hellenistic and Roman periods, explores and explains



fundamental concepts such as universal reason (Logos), nature, and virtue-based ethics. Therefore, there is a special emphasis on the role of reason in attaining truth and aligning with nature. Conversely, Avicenna, as a philosopher working within the cultural and religious context of Islam, sought to integrate these principles with Islamic teachings and present a new, coherent explanation of metaphysical concepts. One of these concepts in his philosophical model is the idea of the "Necessary Being" or God, as a being whose existence is essential. This concept, emphasizing rationality and demonstrability, shares many similarities with the concept of "Logos" in Stoic philosophy. Avicenna used this idea to explain the concept of God as the first cause and the organizer of the universe in a rational and demonstrable manner. Furthermore, the theory of "causality" in Avicenna's philosophy, which asserts that every contingent being has a cause, and the chain of causes ultimately leads to God, the first cause, appears to align with Stoic thought. Despite these similarities, there is a need for deeper and more comprehensive research comparing Stoic philosophy and Avicenna's philosophy. Such an examination could lead to a better understanding of the development of metaphysical concepts in Islamic philosophy and shed light on the interaction between Greek and Islamic philosophical traditions. To clarify this matter, this study will attempt to answer the following question through a comparative-analytical approach: How does Avicenna's rational and metaphysical concept of God as the "Necessary Being" and "First Cause" relate to the idea of the "World Reason" in the later Stoic theology, and what are the points of convergence and divergence between these two philosophical paradigms?

2. Avicenna's Theological Model

Looking at the "History of Religions," it is evident that the discussion of the origin of the concept of "God" as the first theological and religious concept has always been a central issue. Throughout the centuries, humanity has sought a being that, in addition to being a mere idea, also holds primacy and superiority over all beings and phenomena in the universe. In this sense, humanity has constantly sought an entity beyond its own conception, a being that reason cannot fully comprehend. By examining Avicenna's views, it becomes clear that his theology is deeply connected to his ontological and

existential principles (Moallemi, 2006). In fact, Avicenna's theology is a kind of metaphysical theology based on ontological concepts such as the notion of cause, necessity, or non-contingency, and the concept of the first origin. To outline such a theological model in Avicenna's thought, we must first define the core components of this model: God as the Creator and the First Cause of the universe, necessity and possibility, and the relationship between the divine and the material world.

2.1. Foundation of Avicenna's Philosophical Theology

One of the spiritual attractions for humanity is the desire for God, or more accurately, the innate drive for God-seeking, as humans have realized that they are influenced by a force that makes them feel that beyond this "self," another "self" exists within them. Philosophers and theologians have always followed the path of reason and argumentation to discover this hidden truth (Motahhari, 1997). Avicenna, like his philosophical and theological counterparts, also pursues this path, with the difference that his model of theism is entirely based on his ontological understanding. He views God as an existent entity alongside other beings, with the distinction that God's existence is absolutely necessary or, in other words, necessary-being (*wajib al-wujud*), whereas the existence of other beings is possible. In fact, the core of Avicenna's philosophical theology is the concept of "existence," which is a divine-originated existence: an eternal, immaterial existence that is the origin of all phenomena and entities (Ibn Sina, 2004). To better understand Avicenna's philosophical-metaphysical theological model, it is first necessary to examine his categorization of existence.

In his interpretation, existence, in terms of its actualization in the external world, has various meanings. The first meaning is the specific existence, in which Avicenna believes that all phenomena and entities have truths that make them what they are. For example, a triangle has the truth of "triangularity," which is why it is called a triangle (Hassanzadeh Amoli, 2003). Specific existence refers to the truth of all things, i.e., the essential truth of a thing. When we consider specific existence as the essence of a thing, we are referring to the specific truth of that thing, which constitutes its identity. This specific identity is distinct from the general existence, which Avicenna describes as being the essence of all

things. In other words, the essence is separate from existence itself (Haeri Mazandarani, 1983). The second meaning of existence in Avicenna's thought is the general or affirmative existence, which contrasts with the specific existence and is universal in nature. This general existence is shared by all entities and phenomena in the cosmos (Lahiji, 2007; Sajjadi, 1996).

Once we understand the essence of Avicenna's philosophical theology, the question arises: what is the relationship between Avicenna's concept of existence and God? To clarify this relationship, we must first examine Avicenna's conception of God.

2.1.1. *Avicenna's Concept of "God"*

Avicenna employed various methods in his explanation of God. In addition to his use of external and internal means of describing and defining God, he also relied on logical and rational arguments, presenting several proofs such as the argument of necessity and possibility, the argument from causality, and the argument from motion, among others. In fact, the question of understanding God in Avicenna's thought is only possible through defining the necessary consequences of God's existence; because, according to him, the essence of the Necessary Being is not composed of parts or inherent constituents. In other words, defining something by its essential properties is not correct when referring to an entity that has no essence. Since God has no essence, any definition of Him in terms of essential properties would be incorrect (Entezam, 2020). Avicenna believes that the essence of God is identical to His existence (Avicenna, 1981, p. 161), because if God had an essence in the sense that contingent beings have (an essence apart from existence), then His existence would be an addition to His essence, thus requiring a cause. If the cause of the attribution of existence to God were His essence, it would necessitate the precedence of God over His existence, which is impossible (Haeri Mazandarani, 1983). Therefore, according to Avicenna, since God is absolutely simple and immaterial, and a simple being does not have genus, species, or parts, His understanding can only be achieved through His necessary consequences (Ibn Sina, 1981).

Now the question arises: what are the necessary consequences of God's essence that enable us to understand what Avicenna's God is like? In response, it can be stated that Avicenna regards the most important

component in defining God by His necessary attributes as His necessity of existence. Specifically, Avicenna considers God to be purely existence and truth (Ibn Sina, 1997), and this truth is identical to existence, because His essence is one in all respects (Ibn Sina, 1981). Furthermore, such an existential truth has no attribute other than the affirmation of existence; in other words, pure existence is always accompanied by an affirmation of existence (Ibn Sina, 2006). Therefore, the best component for defining God in Avicenna's view is "the Necessary Being" (wajib al-wujud), which inherently indicates the necessity and affirmation of existence.

2.2. *The Role of Existence in Proving the Existence of God*

In response to the question regarding the relationship between existence and God in Avicenna's thought, it can be said that Avicenna, by invoking existence, proves the Necessary Being—whose existence is a necessity.

a) The Proof of Necessity and Possibility

When Avicenna divides existence into necessary and possible existence, he posits that every reality or entity is either necessary (wajib) or possible (mumkin). If we say it is necessary, we have accepted the existence of the Necessary Being (wajib al-wujud) or God, and our goal—to prove the Necessary Being—has been achieved. However, if we accept the second assumption and say that existence is possible (mumkin), then this existence must depend on a necessary existence. In other words, such a being or reality would require a cause, and this cause must either be necessary or possible. To clarify this issue, some preliminary points are necessary (Ibn Sina, 2006):

- **First Premise:** When we say that a phenomenon is possible in existence, it means that it requires a cause. But the question arises: what is this cause? In addressing this issue, it can be said that a possible being cannot have multiple, infinite causes in one instant, especially if those causes themselves are possible. This is because either all these causes exist, or none of them exist. If we assume that all these causes exist and the assumption of a necessary cause for them is not possible, we then face two problems: either this entire set—whether finite or infinite—is necessary by essence, in which case a necessary being would be compounded with possible beings, which is impossible, or this set itself is possible,

in which case it requires a cause that has given it existence (Ibn Sina, 2006).

- **Second Premise:** Now, let us consider the cause of the entire set of possible entities. This cause is either an external cause or an internal cause (part of the set). If this cause is part of the set, and we assume it to be necessary, it is impossible because a necessary being cannot be part of a set of possible beings, and such an assumption is contradictory. On the other hand, if we assume it is part of the set and possible, then such a cause must be the cause of each individual component. Since it is itself one of the components of the set, it would, in effect, be the cause of itself, which is also impossible.

- **Conclusion:** By rejecting these possibilities, it can be concluded that the true cause of the set is external to the set and is necessary by essence. Therefore, all possible phenomena ultimately trace back to a necessary cause, and it is not the case that every possible being has an infinite series of possible causes (Ibn Sina, 2006).

The reason for presenting this proof is to clarify the relationship between the concept of existence and God, which is crucial for understanding the relationship between material possible beings and the transcendent divine or God in Avicenna's philosophical theology. We will explore this further below.

b) The Proof of Causality (The Encounter of the Divine with the Material Realm)

In explaining the relationship between God and matter, the key term is "agent/first cause of the world," which, in fact, paves the way for another proof—the proof of causality—in proving the existence of God. According to Avicenna's cosmology, based on the proof of necessity and possibility, and causality, all possible beings in the world require a cause, and as mentioned earlier, this cause must either be necessary in existence (wajib al-wujud) or lead to a necessary existence, as an infinite chain of causes cannot exist (Ibn Sina, 1981). In this context, a possible being, or possible existence, is dependent and requires a cause, meaning the Necessary Being (wajib al-wujud) and a non-material entity, since the perfections and actualizations of such a being are limited and finite. This dependent being essentially has two conceptual components: first, existence, and second, essence. The causes that bring about the first component, existence, are called existential causes or efficient causes, while the causes that bring about the second component, essence, are called essential causes or constituent causes

(Malek Shahi, 2013). According to Avicenna, all these possible beings—whether material or immaterial—do not come into existence autonomously in the chain of being; rather, they have an existence-giving and creative cause, namely God, who bestows existence upon them (Malek Shahi, 2013).

Since this agent and cause is the origin of all beings and, from all aspects, necessary and singular, it follows that multiplicity does not apply to its essence, and all multiplicities in the chain of existence emanate from it (Beheshti, 2007). Thus, the chain of causes and effects is understood as a hierarchical series. Every effect is in the order of its cause, following it, while every cause precedes and is in a higher order than its effect. In such a chain, the Necessary Being is considered the first cause and the primal matter, and the beings and phenomena of the material world are in a horizontal series relative to each other. This is because none of these phenomena is the true cause of another's existence; rather, their relationship is numerical causality (not real causality). However, the true giver of existence is the Necessary Being. The beings in the hierarchical chain are intermediaries of divine grace, meaning that on the one hand, they receive the grace of existence and, on the other, they give it. If the absolute giver, God, does not bestow grace upon them, all of them remain in complete poverty. Moreover, the beings in the horizontal series, whatever they have, are derived from the higher causes in the hierarchical series (ibid.). These beings depend on the chain of necessity for their very existence, for according to the principle "a thing that is not necessary does not exist," phenomena and objects do not come into existence unless they move from the realm of possibility to the realm of necessity (Ibn Sina, 1981).

In Avicenna's view, the Necessary Being is the conceptualizer of everything other than its first effect, whether in the hierarchical or horizontal series, with respect to its necessity (ibid.). Therefore, in the entire chain of being, everything that has existence ultimately derives its existence from the Necessary Being, which is a transcendent cause. As Avicenna states in *al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat*, the series of possible beings—whether finite or infinite—requires an external cause, and that external cause is the Necessary Being. The possible being is always the intermediate, and only the Necessary Being can be the ultimate cause for the possible beings (Malek Shahi, 2013).

In summary, once we understand that the chain of existence has a cause and origin that is the agent, creator, and bestower of existence, we can discern the relationship between God—the origin of existence and, in a sense, the cause and source of the world—and matter. That is, everything other than God in Avicenna's view is a possible being, in need of an existential cause. Since the material world and material phenomena are part of the set of possible beings, they do not have an inherent claim to existence and depend on a cause to be brought into existence. According to Avicenna, the creation of the world with all its material and immaterial beings—collectively called possible beings—is entirely the work of the Necessary Being. Anything other than the Necessary Being, being a possible being created by an origin known as God (Ibn Sina, 1984), is not qualified to be called a creator, because something that has been created by another cause cannot itself be a cause or creator for other phenomena.

3. The Theological Model of Later Stoics

A closer examination of the views of the later Stoics reveals that the goal of Stoic theology was to explain the governing principle of the cosmos, that is, "God." This God was conceived as a composite of both soul and body: composed of a passive principle ("matter" or "quality-less substance") and an active principle ("logos" or "reason"), which itself is corporeal. In this theological model, there is no distinction between proving the existence of God—referred to as the active principle—and proving the rationality of the universe. In other words, according to the later Stoic theological and ontological model, God is a corporeal being who is identical to the active principle. In this view, God is more accurately described as the eternal and ever-present reason or as a form of intelligent design, fire, or pneuma, which organizes matter according to its own plan. Therefore, the Stoic God exists throughout the cosmos and serves as the guiding force of all beings in the world, even down to the smallest details, because in this worldview, the entire cosmos is considered a living entity, with God standing in relation to it in a manner similar to how the life force of an animal resides within its body, animating and directing its individual cells. The fire of design is compared to a seed or a germ containing the first principles or directions of all things that subsequently develop, making the nature of the cosmos

and all of its parts inherently governed by a rational force. In this conception, God and all His actions—much like the gods in Greek mythology—are not accidental or unpredictable; rather, they are relatively orderly, rational, and willful (Durand & Shogry, 2023).

Given these premises of Stoic theology, it seems that God, as a rational principle, embodies the laws of rationality within Himself. This raises a potential ambiguity, with some perhaps questioning whether it is possible for opposites to include each other—how could God, as a physical and material force, encompass the laws of physics and matter within Himself to the point where certain things cannot come into existence without a precise quantity? (Pervandr). In response to this doubt, it can be argued that the later Stoics, in explaining the relationship between reason and matter, adhered to a materialistic view that aligns with their doctrine of knowledge. Unlike earlier philosophers, they associated knowledge with bodily sensation and reality with matter—specifically, that which can be known through the external senses. According to their belief, it is the body that impresses sensory experiences (i.e., perceptions) upon the soul, and then the soul moves the material body. Thus, from this perspective, both the soul and the body are of the same substance; because if they were not, there would be no interaction between them, meaning neither the material could affect the immaterial nor vice versa. Therefore, everything must be equally material (Stace, 2018).

In this context, for the later Stoics, "physics," "matter," and "nature" serve as one of the four basic causes of all occurrences in the cosmos (Scalenghe, 2017, p. 260). Thus, a proper understanding of the Stoic ontological and theological system is inseparable from the concept of physics and nature—a concept that addresses the world and the phenomena within it, including both God and humanity. Accordingly, the Stoic cosmological and theological perspectives are inherently part of their theory of nature (Carige, 1998).

4. The Concept of Causality in the Thought of Later Stoics

In fact, a prominent feature of the philosophies that emerged after Aristotle's philosophy is their rejection of non-corporeal and irrational causes when explaining the existence of things. The Stoic ontology of causes and effects is explicitly anti-Platonic, as they refused to

accept that non-corporeal beings could exert any influence (De Gruyter, 2013). The Stoics, in contrast to their predecessors, viewed realities and truths as being embodied and material, believing that the essence of a cause is determined by the essence or facts of its objects. This reflects the notion that in their thought, all causes are derived from living entities—such as a seed, the growth of a microorganism, the development of a plant, fire, and so on—which are all entirely material. Therefore, when discussing the cause of the universe, the Stoics claimed that the entire cosmos, with its organization and hierarchy of parts, and its development, stemmed from a kind of fire—fire being a cause that is a living entity. This living entity shares a unity with other living entities. The question that remains ambiguous is what the nature of this unity is in such living entities. In response to this question, it can be said that the essence of this unity is the inner force that sustains them. For example, in plants, this force is nature, and in animals, it is the soul. It is important to note that the later Stoics believed that this inner or self-existent force can only exist in living beings, and the outward form of being merely determines its limits. Thus, causality is truly the essence of existence, not an ideal model that beings merely imitate (Brehier, 1908).

The Stoic conception of causality is based on four fundamental principles:

- **First**, that cause and effect do not share the same ontological status. Causes are corporeal, whereas effects—as will be discussed further—are non-corporeal. Thus, they belong to different ontological categories.
- **Second**, which follows from the first, is that due to the inherent dissimilarity between cause and effect, where an effect is brought into being by a cause, the cause becomes, in turn, the cause of another effect. Since cause and effect are essentially of different kinds, the second cannot replace the first. The Stoics emphasize that only bodies can have causal influence on other things.
- **Third**, the Stoics view causality not as a simple relationship between two things but as a composite (pairwise) relationship, where at least one of the terms in this relationship is non-corporeal. In a sense, this relationship can be seen as a kind of reciprocal interaction, where

the effects of both parties result in the emergence of a non-corporeal property.

- **Fourth**, the Stoics believe that causal relationships are symmetrical. Clement argues that bodies are causes for one another. A knife is the cause of meat, and meat is, in turn, the cause of the knife. The knife causes the property of the meat, which is "being cut," while the meat causes the property of the knife, namely, "cutting." This illustrates that for the later Stoics, causality is a fourfold relationship involving two bodies and two properties, two causes, and two effects. In common understanding, when we assert a causal connection between two things, we mean that the first brings about the second, and not the reverse. In such an understanding, the causal relationship is defined as directional, whereas the later Stoics opposed such directional thinking (De Gruyter, 2013).

5. Comparison and Analysis of Two Paradigms

The analysis and comparison of the theological views of Avicenna and the later Stoics, particularly regarding the relationship between God and matter, provide an opportunity to highlight the fundamental similarities and differences between Islamic philosophy and Stoic philosophy. These will be addressed under the following key research headings:

a. The Relationship Between God and Matter:

- The later Stoics view God as the sole cause of everything, seeing Him as integrated with matter, while maintaining His rational nature. In this view, God is corporeal and directly present within all matter and the structure of the universe. This approach utilizes matter and God as two opposing forces: matter, without any specific quality, and God, as the active, rational principle shaping the world. This perspective establishes an intrinsic, unifying relationship between God and matter, which contrasts with the Islamic theology and philosophy of Avicenna.
- Avicenna regards God, or the Necessary Existent, as a completely non-material being, distinct from matter. In Avicenna's thought, God is the origin of the chain of causes, with

intermediaries between Him and the world, ultimately reaching matter. Here, matter has a nature completely independent of God and is never seen as an internal element of God. Avicenna sees matter not as part of God's existence, but as a lower part of the creation hierarchy, receiving grace through intermediaries from the Necessary Existent.

Comparison of the Stoics and Avicenna: The similarity between Avicenna and the Stoics here is limited to the general concept of rationality and the causal system of the universe. Avicenna's emphasis on the metaphysical distinction between God and the world, and His independence from matter, marks his opposition to the Stoic view of God's immanence in nature and the material world. Thus, the relationship between the Necessary Existent and matter, in Avicenna's view, is a one-way, creative relationship, mediated by intermediaries essential to explaining the correspondence between cause and effect. His view is fundamentally different from Stoic philosophy due to its influences from Islamic metaphysics and Aristotelian theories.

b. The First Cause:

- The later Stoics regard God not only as the first cause but also as the determining and controlling cause of each individual event in the world. The Stoic worldview is based on a rational order established by God in the form of the *Logos*. God is corporeal and immanent, and since everything originates from Him, matter and God are so interconnected that their separation is impossible. Consequently, the organization of the universe is internally rational and harmonious, structured by God's natural forces.
- Avicenna strongly emphasizes God's independence from the world, viewing God as the unparalleled, non-material first cause. In this view, God influences the world and matter through intermediaries and determines a specific cause for each being. The world and matter require intermediaries to connect them to the essence of God; thus, the relationship between God and the world is not direct or immanent.

Comparison of the Stoics and Avicenna: The similarity between Avicenna's and the Stoic philosophy lies in the concept of the "first cause," though Avicenna uses this idea within a completely new framework, offering a rational-theological interpretation. While accepting the generality of this idea, Avicenna removes God from being conflated with matter and the world, attributing to Him non-materiality, independence, and absolute perfection. This can be seen as a critique of the Stoic limitations in linking God with the world.

c. The Correspondence (or Contrast) Between Matter and God:

- The later Stoics regard God and matter as a single corporeal entity, and the relationship between them—despite both being corporeal—is entirely metaphysical. This metaphysical element is the unifying principle common to all phenomena. In fact, the correspondence between God and matter—where one is the active material cause (i.e., God) and the other the passive material (i.e., matter, nature, or specifically the human body)—means that the active material permeates the passive, resulting in a causal relationship that imparts properties and characteristics to physical phenomena.
- Avicenna, whose theology is grounded in metaphysical principles, contrasts matter with God. He argues that God is a pure, immaterial being, entirely distinct from matter, and He is both rational in His essence and intelligible for His essence. God has no affinity with the material world and is free from any hint of corporeality.

Comparison of the Stoics and Avicenna: While the Stoics view God as an active material force interacting with passive matter, Avicenna strongly emphasizes God's immateriality and His complete independence from matter. This difference in perspective highlights that, unlike the Stoics, Avicenna does not believe in a physical bond between God and matter. His theory focuses more on the separation of God from matter and the establishment of a causal system based on the Necessary Existent. Therefore, the boundary Avicenna sets between himself and the Stoics is broad and foundational, with significant differences in detail regarding the relationship between God and matter.

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, based on the preceding discussion, it can be summarized that the convergence of the Stoic and Avicennian theologies is evident in their rational approach to the world, particularly within a paradigmatic framework that seeks to explain the position of God, matter, and their intermediary relationship. However, in terms of the content of their theological systems and the articulation of foundational principles, clear distinctions emerge between these two philosophical perspectives. Avicenna, with his emphasis on the independence and transcendence of God from matter and his understanding of the world as a grace bestowed by God, strives to create a theology that is more consistent with the principles of Islamic philosophy and divine metaphysics. This approach distinctly separates him from the later Stoics and positions him as one of the founders of Islamic metaphysical thought, aiming to explain a non-material and transcendent theological concept for both God and the world.

In contrast, the Stoics maintain God within the boundaries of nature, presenting Him as an intelligent principle that permeates the essence of nature—a God who, while being the origin, is not metaphysical. Therefore, there is no intermediary correspondence between God and matter, which inevitably imposes the necessity of intermediaries in Stoic thought. In Avicenna's philosophy, one might consider the Active Intellect or the Heavenly Soul as a counterpart to such a God, not as the ultimate cause, but as an intermediary that interacts within the natural order and manages the organization of the material world.

The world Avicenna envisions, due to its infinite abstract realm, is far larger and grander than the finite and corporeal world of the Stoics. Therefore, justifying the relationship between the immaterial and material realms becomes more difficult and complex in Avicenna's dualistic system. The later Stoic worldview aligns more with physicalists than metaphysicians, and it could be argued that in today's world—where physicalist thought has become the dominant intellectual framework—Stoic theology may enjoy greater acceptance. Moreover, due to the absence of an abstract realm, Stoic theology faces fewer logical limitations compared to other theological ideas. In comparison to

religious thought—whether Islamic or Christian—the Stoic worldview contains fewer methodological and foundational similarities to Avicenna's ideas.

Authors' Contributions

Authors contributed equally to this article.

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In order to correct and improve the academic writing of our paper, we have used the language model ChatGPT.

Transparency Statement

Data are available for research purposes upon reasonable request to the corresponding author.

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